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State of the field: Why novel prediction matters
Heather Douglas and P.D. Magnus 1
ABSTRACT:
There is considerable disagreement about the
epistemic value of novel predictive success, i.e.
when a scientist predicts an unexpected
phenomenon, experiments are conducted, and the
prediction proves to be accurate. We survey the
field on this question, noting both fully articulated
views such as weak and strong predictivism, and
more nascent views, such as pluralist reasons for
the instrumental value of prediction. By
examining the various reasons offered for the
value of prediction across a range of inferential
contexts (including inferences from data to
phenomena, from phenomena to theory, and from
theory to framework), we can see that neither
weak nor strong predictivism captures all of the
reasons for valuing prediction available. A third
path is presented, Pluralist Instrumental
Predictivism; PIP for short.
Imagine three scientists. The first uses her theory to make a novel
prediction, tests it, and the prediction is successful, garnering support
for her theory. The second collects some evidence, and then alters her
theory to accommodate the evidence. The third secretly gathers some
evidence in her lab, accommodates her theory to the evidence, then
publicly makes a prediction using her new theory that the evidence she
already gathered will obtain (which it does again). The third scientist is
obviously deceiving people about something; more than that, the
deception seems to undercut the legitimacy of her results. As Gardner
writes, it seems that lying about whether one had actually predicted or
only accommodated evidence “would be a form of scientific dishonesty
akin to fabricating experimental results” (Gardner, 1982, p. 11). But
why should the third scientist’s misbehaviour seem relevant to the
evidential status of her results? A natural answer is that she is
1
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pretending to more epistemic warrant than she has, but this only makes
sense if mere accommodation does not provide as much support for the
theory as prediction. Thus, our reaction to the third scientist depends in
part on whether we think that the first scientist has better support for
her theory than the second.
The intuition that the first scientist does in fact have better support
for her theory than the second or third is the intuition of predictivism,
the idea that successful predictions generally provide better epistemic
support than merely accommodating the evidence. Predictivists will say
that the first scientist has the best support for her theory, and that the
third scientist has done something horribly dishonest, not just ethically
but epistemically. The opposing view, accommodationism, holds that
there is no epistemic difference between the three scientists and the
third scientist lied only about incidental things, not about anything
epistemically significant. The question is not just which view is right
— predictivism or accommodationism — but why and in what
contexts.
Predictivism in any form requires consideration not just of the
available body of relevant evidence but also how and when that
evidence was gathered. Thus, one can think of predictivism as a form
of scientific assessment that requires some historical understanding of
how a scientific claim was developed and tested. This enters into the
long-standing debate between (on the one hand) those who view the
epistemic support for theories as resting solely with the logical
relationship between evidence and theory and (on the other hand) those
who view epistemic support as resting at least in part with how the
theory was developed and tested. As Musgrave (1974) noted, Leibniz,
Whewell, and Duhem all subscribed to the idea that predicting data was
ceteris paribus better than accommodating it, while Mill and Keynes
disagreed (Musgrave, 1974, pp. 1–2; see also Maher, 1988, p. 1).
Concern over novel predictions has been embedded in particular
debates, but has also emerged as a philosophical topic in its own right.
In the 1970s, the debate centered on the Lakatosian idea that only novel
predictions made a program “progressive” (Lakatos, 1978). With such
a strong requirement for novel predictions, much discussion concerned
what counted as “novel.” Philosophers from Zahar (1973) to Gardner
(1982) argued against the requirement of temporal novelty in which
prediction must be made before evidence gathered. In order to maintain
‘prediction’ as paramount while still accommodating philosophical
intuitions and the history of science, the intuitive concept of novelty as
temporal was replaced with heuristic or use-novelty. Evidence counts
as a use-novel prediction of a theory if the scientist did not use
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knowledge of the evidence in constructing the theory. Such expansion
in the meaning of novelty came at a price. It is relatively easy to
determine whether a prediction was temporally novel; deceptions of the
kind in the our opening paragraph are rare. It is more difficult to assess
use-novelty; see sec. 3.2, below.
By the 1980s, the debate shifted away from Lakatosian accounts of
theory change and assessments of research programmes to whether
formal theories of confirmation (especially Bayesian) could
accommodate predictivist intuitions and to what role novel predictions
could play in the debates about realism. The discussion on Bayesian
methods and predictivist intuitions flourished to such an extent that by
the mid-1990s, all possible positions on the role of predictivism within
Bayesian confirmation theory had been defended.2
Predictivism, as both its own term and within the frame of the
current debate, emerged in the late 1980s (Maher, 1988). Rather than
focusing on debates about theory change, confirmation theories, or
realism, the question of whether and to what extent successful novel
prediction conferred stronger epistemic weight became its own topic of
discussion. Since the late 1980s, the debate has centered largely on the
following terrain: First, predictivists largely agree that accommodated
evidence does provide some epistemic support.3 So novel prediction is
not the only way to gain epistemic support, as it was for the
Lakatosians. What predictivists argue is that prediction provides more
or better epistemic support than accommodation. Second, novel
prediction is now taken roughly to mean heuristic or use-novelty; the
question is whether scientists considered the already known evidence
when constructing the theory: If they did, they performed an
accommodation. If not, their theory successfully ‘predicted’ the
evidence (even though the evidence was already available). Because
the view that only novel predictions provide epistemic support is no
2

Brush writes that “philosophers have defended all four possible
positions: Bayesian analysis is (i) valid because it favors novel
prediction, (ii) valid because it does not favor novel predictions,
(iii) invalid because it favors novel predictions, and (iv) invalid
because it does not favor novel predictions” (Brush, 1994, p. 134).
3
The question of what kind of support and support of what can vary.
Thus, Worrall argues that accommodated evidence only supports a
particular version of a theory if scientists have already accepted the
more general version of the theory and that accommodated
evidence provides no support for the general version of the theory.
(Scerri and Worrall, 2001, p. 425–6)
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longer on the table, predictivists do not need to worry as much about
the problems of assessing when a case is prediction or accommodation.
If it is hard to tell whether a scientist made a use-novel prediction or
accommodation, we can simply presume it was an accommodation and
then assess the strength of epistemic support qua accommodation —
that will still count for something.
Even with such a mild form of predictivism (in which
accommodation counts too but just not as much, and where heuristic or
use novelty is sufficient for ‘novel prediction’) it has still been a
challenge to articulate why prediction is preferable to accommodation.
Sometimes the argument is couched in naturalist terms: do scientists
grant prediction special status or not? This literature is interesting, as it
shows at least in part how difficult it can be to assess a particular
historical example and whether it supports predictivist or
accommodationist tendencies. Key historical examples have been
evaluated and reevaluated, making it vexed as to whether or not actors
treated novel prediction as special. Regarding diffraction, Fresnel’s
wave theory of light, and the bright spot, see inter alia Giere (1983)
contra Worrall (1989). Regarding Einstein, relativity, and the
perihelion of Mercury, see Zahar (1973) contra Earman and Glymour
(1978). One of the most detailed debates on predictivism in the history
of science has concerned Mendeleev and the predictions he made using
the periodic law; see Brush (1996; 2007), Scerri and Worrall (2001),
Worrall (2005), Scerri (2005), McIntyre (2001), Barnes (2005), and
Schindler (2008). Despite the centrality of predictivism in the case of
Mendeleev for Maher (1988) and Lipton (2004), it remains unclear
whether and to what extent scientists were persuaded by predictions of
new elements or revised atomic weights, rather than by
accommodations of already well known chemical phenomena. Given
the complexity of history, such uncertainty is not surprising. As Harker
notes, “examples and counterexamples fuel, but don’t settle, the
debates” (Harker, 2008, p. 444). In many of the key historical
examples, both stunning novel prediction and elegant accommodation
of previously known data occur together. This makes trying to
determine what actually impressed scientists at the time historically
challenging.
This complexity points to a third possibility on the value (or not) of
novel prediction. Many contemporary authors maintain that prediction
is better than accommodation, but that this is not an irreducible virtue.
Rather, prediction is good just because it reliably correlates with some
other epistemic virtue. Such philosophers are willing to abandon
prediction in cases where the other good is clearly in view. For
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example, Harker (2008) argues that prediction just serves as a
defeasible sign of explanatory power. Where it is possible to assess
explanatory virtue directly, on his view, prediction is superfluous. This
move distinguishes between strong predictivism (the view that there is
some intrinsic value to prediction) and weak predictivism (the view
that prediction is a surrogate for something else).4
Finally, there is a view nascent in the literature that is orthogonal to
the strong/weak opposition. Suppose that prediction is not an intrinsic
epistemic virtue, but rather that it serves as an instrumental indicator.
Yet it can be a proxy for disparate sources of epistemic assurance. So it
does not reduce to one particular virtue (as in weak predictivism), but
neither does it have some kind of intrinsic epistemic virtue (as in strong
predictivism). We dub this Pluralist Instrumental Predictivism (in sec.
5), and it is a position that can be articulated by coming to grips with
the present state of the debate. As we proceed in this overview of the
literature, we will focus on the recent philosophical debates on
prediction, organizing as we go the reasons to think that novel
prediction provides some instrumental assurance in a range of cases.
We will then assess what this collection of reasons means for weak
predictivism in its various guises.
To look ahead, our survey is structured along the following lines.
We will first structure the levels of scientific inference for which novel
prediction can be relevant. We consider inferences from data to
phenomena, inferences from phenomena to theory, and inferences from
theory to framework. We distinguish these levels in the next section,
and then proceed to examine reasons for why novel prediction might be
useful at each level. We conclude our survey by considering what we
have gleaned from the literature for the views of Worrall and weak
predictivists of various stripes.
1 Data, Phenomena, Theories, and Framework
Before surveying the range of reasons one might value novel prediction
in scientific practice, we distinguish four levels across which scientists
make inferences. Making these distinctions will serve as the organizing
basis for explicating the value of novel prediction.
In this paper, there are four levels of concern: data, phenomena,
theory, and framework. On the side of evidence, we draw from Bogen
and Woodward (1988) to distinguish data from phenomena. On the
side of theory, it is important to distinguish particular hypotheses
4
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subject to testing from broader, less-testable systems of background
theories. We will call the former theory and the latter framework. These
levels range from the rawest observation to the most sophisticated
general commitments. To describe each in more detail:
The data are raw observations, such as the individual numbers or
points on a scatter plot. They must be “relatively easy to identify,
classify, measure, aggregate, and analyze in ways that are reliable and
reproducible” (Bogen and Woodward, 1988, p. 320). Particular
observations are idiosyncratic; they are disturbed randomly by noise
and error.
The phenomena are the patterns in the world that are indicated by
data, such as the true curve which underlies a scatter plot. The
transformation of data into phenomena is a matter of statistics, data
analysis, or data reduction. The phenomena “have stable, repeatable
characteristics which will be detectable by means of a variety of
different procedures, which may yield quite different kinds of data”
(Bogen and Woodward, 1988, p. 317). Repeating an experiment and
reproducing the result will not generate the same data, but it should
provide new data that instantiate the same phenomena.
The theory typically predicts and explains phenomena. It is general,
in that it will apply across more than just one kind of situation and
often ties apparently different phenomena together. One can think of
theories as sets of models, laws, or postulated entities and causal
relations that provide explanations and predictions of the phenomena of
concern.
The framework is the partly implicit background against which
particular theories are formed. It includes auxiliary hypotheses and
related commitments which are necessary in order for the theory to
yield determinate predictions, such as commitments about when
conditions or entities are the same. (As a tacit but unobjectionable
example: It does not matter for a physics experiment which day of the
week you do it on.) It also includes the motivation for particular
theories along with general assumptions about the domain of
phenomena and about how various pieces of experimental equipment
do or do not function.
All four levels will be prominent in at least some cases. For
example, consider rival explanations of growth perturbations and small
size among people raised in adverse conditions. Schell and Magnus
(2007) describe two rival theoretical approaches. The adaptationist
approach tries to explain scrawniness as an adaptation to harsh
conditions. The medical approach explains it instead as a disease or
disfunction, harm done to people by their adverse conditions. These are
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each general frameworks (in our sense) which underwrite specific
theories. For example, the adaptationist approach might suggest the
hypothesis that smaller people would be better off than bigger ones
under conditions of scarcity because they need less food. This is a
particular theory (in our sense) and it can be tested. Schell and Magnus
argue that this distinction is important to understanding the rivalry
between the two approaches.5 The test of a particular hypothesis
involves considering a large collection of specific measurements. The
raw numbers are taken to indicate a general relation, perhaps between
body mass, food intake, and physical performance. The raw
measurements are the data, and the relation is the phenomenon. The
relation is in turn used as a proxy for fitness, so the phenomenon can
serve as evidence for or against the theory. If the theory succeeds, then
this provides support for the framework; if it fails, then it is a demerit
for the framework.
Nevertheless, it may not be possible to distinguish all four levels in
every case. For example, there might be no distinction between
phenomena and theory for some phenomenological or statistical
hypotheses; cf. Glymour (2000). Regardless, there are typically more
than two levels. In what follows, we will survey various reasons in the
literature that novel prediction underwrites — with more epistemic
assurance than accommodation — inferences among the adjacent levels
of the hierarchy. Different, albeit conceptually related, reasons for the
increased epistemic assurance arise in these different contexts.
2 Values for novel prediction
In this section, we glean from the literature reasons that novel
prediction provides epistemic value over and above accommodation at
each boundary between levels — moving from data to phenomena,
from phenomena to theory, and from theory to framework.
Often, this value derives from the incomplete nature of our
knowledge. Perhaps, as many have argued, the value of novel
prediction would diminish were we to have complete epistemic clarity
regarding the available evidence and the claims made about it. For
example, White considers the limits of predictivism by positing
problems that arise for agents that are “thoroughly familiar with the
content of [the theory] and all the independent evidence supporting it”
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(White, 2003, pp. 657–8).6 Even then, it would not evaporate entirely.
Minimally, the process of making and testing a prediction produces
additional relevant evidence. We concede, however, that the problem
posed from a standpoint of perfect information makes predictivism
seem thin. The problem, it seems to us, is with the standpoint and not
with predictivism. For those interested in the value of novel prediction
for actual scientific practice and inference, it matters that scientists are
never in a situation of perfect knowledge and transparency. Taking
seriously the actual epistemic context of science, where theories are
rarely perfectly articulated and logical vision is limited, provides a
clearer understanding for the value of prediction over accommodation.
We can see this across a range of inferential contexts in science.
2.1 Data-phenomena relations: The danger of overfitting
Fitting a curve to data requires moving from a plot of discrete,
particular observations to a formula which correctly defines the relation
between quantities; that is, it is a matter of using the data to figure out
the phenomenon. As a matter of mathematics, one can almost always
write down a high-order polynomial which passes precisely through
each and every data point.7 Yet this is never what one actually does. It
would be a mistake to make the curve match the data exactly, because
we know that the phenomena do not do so. The actual data include
error and noise. Indeed, this is one reason for the data-phenomena
distinction.
Instead of writing down a baroque, perfect-fit polynomial, one
draws a simpler curve that gets pretty close to the data points. There are
various formal methods for doing so. Sober and coauthors apply one in
particular, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), to defend the value
of simplicity (Forster and Sober, 1994) and novel prediction
(Hitchcock and Sober, 2004). Given some data generated with random
error, one can do a better job predicting future data by drawing
something simpler than the best-fit polynomial. As the amount of data
increases, one can justifiably draw a higher-order better-fit curve. The
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See also Collins (1994), p. 222.
We say ‘almost always’ because there may be data points with the
same x value but different y values, and then y cannot be
represented as a function of x. Throwing out troublesome points,
we might instead say: one can always write down a polynomial that
passes through almost all of the data points.
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AIC provides a quantitative procedure for deciding how complicated
the curve should be.
The connection between AIC and predicting future data makes a
(qualified) case for predictivism. If a scientist overfits the data with a
grotesque curve, then he will make poor predictions about future data.
Contrapositively, if a scientist makes successful predictions, then we
can infer that he has not overfit the data. Although AIC is easiest to
illustrate with the example of fitting polynomial curves to plots of data,
it readily generalizes to cases where some amount of data is treated
with models that have some number of parameters. Too many
parameters will be a sign of overfitting, and predictive success will be a
sign that there are not too many parameters. AIC provides a precise
way to determine when the amount of data is sufficient to justify the
better fit provided by an additional parameter. Because AIC provides a
way of determining this transparently, however, this is only a qualified
defense of predictivism. Hitchcock and Sober argue that there is no
further value to novel prediction once we know that AIC has been met.
Although AIC can be applied generally to any case of fitting nparameter models to N points of data, such cases are only for
inferences from data to phenomena. The examples which Hitchcock
and Sober give underscore the fact that we are not talking about
theories in any strong sense; e.g.:
Marsha measures the width of her desk with a tape measure.
She holds the end of the tape with ‘0’ on it at one end of the
desk, and observes that the other end of the desk coincides
almost exactly with the line on the tape labeled ‘150’. On the
basis of this observation, she hypothesizes that the desk is
between 149 and 151 centimeters wide. (Hitchcock and
Sober, 2004, p. 6, also p. 24)
They offer this example to show that accommodation is not always
bad; it seems OK that Marsha forms her belief about the length of the
desk after making the measurement. The data is one measurement
made with a tape measure; the implicit one-parameter model is just that
the desk has a width x. The conclusion made from this measurement is
that the actual parameter value is close to 150; that is, the desk is
approximately as wide as it was measured to be. The width of the desk
is a phenomenon, because it is the real value which must be inferred
from the data. Even more general facts, like the mean width of desks on
campus, would still be phenomena in this sense. It is far from being a
theory of anything. The general problem of curve fitting, although
more complex than just measuring desks, is still primarily a matter of
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figuring out the phenomenon on the basis of data. Hitchcock and
Sober’s argument shows at most that the advantages of novel
prediction at this level can be replaced by the machinery of the AIC, if
it is properly applicable.8
Churchland (1989, esp. pp. 179–181) makes a point regarding overfitting which is similar to Sober et al., although in an entirely different
formal framework. For Churchland, the data are represented by the
input nodes of a neural network. Network weights are set by a learning
algorithm in response to a training set of data. Each input in the
training set has a normative output. Churchland gives the example of a
network trained to distinguish rocks from mines based on sonar data. If
the network has too much internal structure, the weights can effectively
encode each input from the training set; but a network which has just
learned the idiosyncrasies of the training set will not give correct
outputs when faced with novel data. A network with simpler internal
structure cannot master the training set just by encoding facts about
each distinct data point; to succeed, it must find a general pattern.
Although Churchland calls the representation at the hidden layer a
‘theory’, in our terminology the general pattern is clearly the
phenomenon.
For Churchland — as for Sober and Forster — a needlessly
complex account is likely to not be predictively successful because it is
likely to have overfit the data. As such, an account that is predictively
successful is shown not to have overfit the data and so not to be
needlessly complex. Successful prediction is an assurance that one has
not overfit the data, and that future predictions will also be successful.
Such assurance is obviously very valuable in science. The question is
whether prediction is a mere surrogate that can be generally replaced
by a formula like AIC or an analysis of network complexity. We think
not. Instead, novel prediction provides a crucial supplement and
support to the proper use of tools like the AIC. Here are some reasons
why:
8

The adaptationist approach to growth, discussed above, illustrates
this. It is clear how AIC might be used to identify relations
between body mass, food intake, and physical performance. Given
data, it can be used to identify the phenomena. Yet performance at
specific physical tasks is used as a proxy for fitness, a term which
appears at the theory level and which cannot be measured directly.
It is not clear how the AIC could function at this level, in relating
theory to phenomena.
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First, the AIC only applies if certain assumptions hold (see Forster
and Sober, 1994). Although the number of data points and free
parameters can readily be counted up, we can never be entirely sure
that the formula applies. Whether or not the assumptions needed to
apply AIC are present cannot itself be shown by using AIC. Different,
external assurance is required. Novel prediction can provide some of
that assurance, showing us that AIC and how we are applying it is on
track.
Second, applying AIC requires dividing models into natural
families. In the curve-fitting case, we can treat orders of polynomials as
the families of models. Yet a high-order polynomial can be made into a
model with one free parameter by writing in all but one of the
coefficients. It would be perverse to do this arbitrarily, but in the
general case of n-parameter models it may be possible to motivate
specific values for some of the parameters. There is no formal rule for
when this is or is not legitimate. Forster and Sober call this the
subfamily problem. Identifying the families of legitimate models (i.e.,
solving the subfamily problem) requires constraints from what we have
called the levels of theory and framework — levels where AIC does
not readily apply. Appealing to AIC as grounds for thinking that
accommodation is just as good as prediction, in a specific case, thus
relies on background commitments which themselves cannot be based
on AIC. Novel prediction can help provide crucial assurance that the
way we are thinking about families of models is appropriate, thus again
assisting with the application of AIC.
Third, the general idea of prediction as insurance against overfitting does not require the AIC approach; recall that Churchland makes
the same point in a very different formal idiom. This suggests that the
precise judgement which AIC yields is not decisive. It is not the
singular algorithm for determining when prediction is of no value over
accommodation. Instead, it is one (nice and precise) way of assessing
the assurance against over-fitting that novel prediction also generally
supplies. Moreover, the fact that insurance against over-fitting is more
general than AIC provides some license for appealing to novel
predictive success where, for technical reasons, AIC does not apply.
One may object that these are quibbles. After all, we agree with
Hitchcock and Sober that this advantage of prediction over
accommodation, insurance against overfitting, diminishes as the
amount of data increases. In extreme cases, where we take phenomena
to be established matters of fact, a prediction that the pattern will
continue carries negligible epistemic weight (but then so does any
additional accommodation). Measuring the length of a desk and then
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predicting that the desk will have the same length tomorrow is
unimpressive, because the phenomenon is entirely familiar. Where we
need epistemic assurance is not in the cases of the familiar, but rather
in the cases of the unfamiliar. In cases where the phenomena are not an
entirely settled matter, confirmation of a novel prediction will always
retain some value. Minimally, it will add evidence. Additionally, it can
bolster our assurance that the more formal AIC approach (or some
other formal approach) is being applied properly. And in cases of
inference from data to phenomena that are more qualitative, to which
AIC simply cannot apply, novel prediction can still be a source of
assurance that we have neither oversimplified nor overfit. Novel
prediction thus typically provides more assurance than accommodation
in inferences from data to phenomena.
2.2 Theory-phenomena relations: The power of relevance
What of inferences from phenomena to the explanations and theories
postulated to account for them? Novel prediction offers several
epistemic advantages over accommodation for inferences made here as
well.
For the purposes of this survey, we take it that theories (including
models and laws) relate to phenomena primarily through explanatory
relations. Explanations explain phenomena by invoking theoretical
machinery such as causal relations and laws, and thus show how these
theoretical ideas link up with phenomena on the ground. Theories, and
the explanations that invoke them to explain phenomena, help us to
conceptually organize an otherwise chaotic world of phenomena. In the
generation of theories that identify these explanatory relations,
accommodation plays a key role. Already-known phenomena constrain
scientists’ creativity in generating new explanatory ideas, which are
ultimately the source of new theories. But as with the relationship
between data and phenomena, prediction (usually) goes one step
further and (typically) provides additional epistemic merit.
The close working relationship between explanation and prediction
is central to the generation of this epistemic merit. The explanations at
the heart of a scientific theory not only organize already known
phenomena, they are also the tools that should be used to predict new
phenomena. As Douglas (2009) has argued, all scientific explanations
have cognitive aspects that enable us to move from what is postulated
by a theory to the next novel prediction. Examining deductivenomological, causal, mechanistic, and unifying explanations, Douglas
shows how each kind of explanation is the generator of predictions in a
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well-functioning theory. Phenomena are predicted through the use of
explanations, and the predictions then guide tests to provide evidence
for the theory. The prediction thus plays a crucial part in testing the
explanation and the theory of which it is a part.
Successful novel predictions tell us several things about the
explanations (and theories) that produced them. First, most obviously,
novel predictions add additional pieces of directly relevant
confirmatory evidence for the explanations. New evidence, particularly
evidence of new relevant phenomena, is a key epistemic bonus in
science. New evidence or new evidential relations throw an evidential
gauntlet down for competitor theories — they must accommodate the
new evidence or risk epistemic demerit. Accommodation is usually
possible, but the point here is that accommodation did not produce the
new evidence nor did it bring new evidence into the purview of the
theory, showing that it was relevant to an area previously unconnected
to it.
Note that this advantage obtains even if the predicted fact was
already known, provided it was not used in the construction of the
theory; i.e., if the prediction was only use-novel. In such cases, the
evidence was not connected to the particular theoretical domain before,
not brought under any competitors’ explanations. Seeing even
previously known evidence as relevant to a new area is an important
explanatory and epistemic accomplishment.9
Second, novel predictions provide some inductive ground for
confidence in the ability of an explanation to help guide us to further
new predictions. In turn, this can open up new evidential terrain for
exploration. An explanation that has been used to produce a successful
novel prediction has proven itself fruitful, giving us reason to think that
it can help us think productively about the world. Such an explanation
is a powerful tool, which matters greatly to scientists, who need such
conceptual tools. Novel prediction here gives us an assurance about the
evidential fecundity of the explanation and theory that produced it
which accommodation cannot. Of course, this assurance is fallible. It
might be that, next time, the explanation fails to produce successful
novel predictions. But its past success is a modest inductive assurance.
Third, and finally, novel prediction gives us some assurance that we
have not fiddled around too much with our core explanatory structures
9

If the evidence is not new to the domain, it is unlikely it would be
use-novel. Only in cases of formal parameter setting, much
discussed by Worrall, can good cases be made that known-to-be
relevant evidence is indeed use-novel. More on this below.
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to make them fit the available phenomena. (Lipton, 2004, p. 170) Just
as projections of phenomena can be overfit to data, theories can be
overfit to known phenomena. Unlike the curve-fitting context,
however, there is no formal measure like AIC to help at the level of
explanations and theories.10 Lacking such a formal measure, novel
prediction can provide a crucial guard against overfitting.
Accommodation provides no such assurance. Novel prediction is thus a
potent tool for constraining our explanatory imagination, because it
forces us to pit our favored explanations and theories against the world
in a way that accommodation does not. Novel predictions are a crucial
way of telling the extent to which our theories may be tuned too much
to the available evidence and not projectable beyond it; they provide a
piece of instrumentally valuable assurance.
The link between explanation and prediction which gives us
confidence in explanatory theories that successfully predict also makes
it clearer why predictive flukes are worrisome. Predictive success
severed from explanatory or theoretical contexts makes it very unclear
what we are supposed to be assured about. Novel predictions provide
assurances for the explanations and theories we use to generate those
predictions. Divorced from this context, it is hard to know what to
think. For example, consider coin-tossing cases. Imagine a series of
coin tosses and a prognosticator who predicts the outcomes
successfully, such that we do not know how the prognosticator is
managing it. The predictive success appears free-floating and,
plausibly, a fluke. Barnes illuminates such cases by expanding the
example to include a whole community of coin-flipologists. If that
community is large enough, our intuitive trust in a successful predictor
— who now just looks like a lottery winner — drops dramatically
(Barnes, 1996, p. 74). But specific coin toss results are data rather than
phenomena, so consider another example. Bode’s Law was a
mathematical formula that accommodated and then predicted the size
of the planetary orbits, clearly phenomena rather than data. It was a
modest predictive success before 1846, predicting the distance to
10

It is impossible to group together classes of theories, which would
be required to solve the relevant subfamily problem; e.g.
Newtonian mechanics might be one or many theories, depending
on how we organize constraints and force laws. Additionally, it is
often not clear how to count the number of free parameters; the
Newtonian description of a specific system has a determinate
number of parameters, but Newtonian systems generally do not.
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Uranus and the location of the asteroid belt.11 Without an explanatory
theory, it was easy to think of the rule’s two predictive successes as
flukes — particularly once Neptune was discovered, far from where
Bode’s Law said it should be. If some mechanism had produced the
regularity and if our theory of that mechanism also successfully
predicted other phenomena, it would not have been dismissed so
quickly. With both Bode’s Law and the coin tossing predictions, we
have no theoretical or explanatory claims to which we can tie the
predictive success.
Contrast this with the case of Fresnel and the ability of his wave
mechanics for light to ‘predict’ diffraction fringes.12 As Worrall (1989)
notes, there was only one parameter to fix, the wavelength of light, to
make the theory fit the phenomena. Once Fresnel had a measure of the
wavelength of light he was using, he could use his mathematical theory
of diffraction to predict diffraction fringes from any configuration, and
very precisely. So, Fresnel’s theory can be considered to produce the
use-novel prediction of the diffraction measurements as well as the
novel prediction of the spot. All provided stunning support for his
theory, and given the precision of the diffraction measurements and the
numerous predictions made and measured there, it is not surprising the
French Academy’s prize commission of 1819 would focus on them.
The explanatory structure of wave interference (which causes
diffraction patterns), made precise in Fresnel’s theory, produced novel
and successful predictions (some use-novel, others temporally novel)
and garnered profound support.
Consider also the case of Mendeleev. The theoretically thin
predictions which he made on the basis of his periodic table at least had
the periodic law behind them — some explanatory apparatus, plus a
plethora of diverse accommodated evidence. His predictions came
directly out of thinking through the implications of the periodic law,
including the revised atomic weights and additional elements (some of
which were erroneous predictions, as Scerri and Worrall (2001, p. 439)
point out). Initially, the noble gases were thought to be a threat to
11

For more details, see McIntyre (2001), p. 315-316.
We use cautionary quotes because it is a prediction in the usenovel sense only; that is, he did not use the specific diffraction data
to derive his theory. Because this is a case of precise parameter
fixing, whether Fresnel had the specific diffraction fringe
measurements in hand before developing the mathematics was
irrelevant. Although a case of use-novel prediction, it illustrates the
value of novel prediction generally.
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Mendeleev’s theory. Yet it was quickly suggested that one needed to
simply add another column to the periodic table to accommodate argon.
Successful predictions of neon and other noble gases swiftly followed
(Scerri and Worrall, 2001, p. 442–447). This case shows the tight
relationships between accommodation, explanation, and prediction
when the theory is working well. Minimal accommodation, when
needed, should lead quickly to new predictions, which then bolster our
confidence in the explanations provided. If the addition of a column to
the periodic table had not yielded successful new predictions, it would
have looked like an ad hoc strategy merely to save the table. Because
of the successful predictions, it looks like a legitimate move.13 In
scientific practice, accommodations need to prove themselves with
additional predictions.
Novel predictions of phenomena, predicted using the core
explanations of a theory, provide the following epistemic goods: (1)
new relevant phenomena are discovered and/or known phenomena are
shown to be relevant to a theory, (2) the evidential fruitfulness of the
explanations and their reliability in helping us navigate the world is
demonstrated, and (3) we are assured that we have not been excessively
creative in our development of any needed accommodations,
explanations, and theories, i.e. that such conceptual work is not
‘overfitted’. Accommodation has nothing to offer for (1) or (2), and it
is worry over accommodative practices that is the reason we need
prediction to provide assurance of kind (3). Novel predictions provide
us with particular, if imperfect, epistemic assurance over
accommodations when examining theories and the phenomena they try
to explain.
2.3 Theory-framework relations: Seeing the big picture
Finally, consider inferences from theory to framework.
Eric Barnes (2008) advocates a version of the realist no miracles
argument which he dubs the ‘miraculous endorsement’ argument.14
13

This illustrates a point we emphasize in our discussion of weak
predictivism below: Novel prediction bolsters our confidence more
than direct assessments of simplicity, which are contentious. In the
Mendeleev case, was adding another column simple? Simplicity of
theories is a cipher, whereas the successful novel predictions can at
least readily be seen as such.
14
Parts of this section follow the exegesis of Barnes given by
Magnus (2011).
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Rather than arguing for the existence of specific phenomena or the
truth of specific theories, the miraculous endorsement argument is
concerned with the success of scientific practice in general. It roughly
takes this form: Scientists make predictions which are verified. If these
scientists were merely guessing or accommodating prior evidence, then
this success would be an inexplicable miracle. Alternatively, this
success could be explained by scientists’ general reliability. So
scientists are (probably, mostly) reliable. The reliability of their
methods only makes sense if scientists’ background theories are true.
So those background theories are (probably, approximately) true.
As Barnes acknowledges, this argument echoes ones made by other
philosophers. Richard Boyd, for example, argues that the general
reliability of the frameworks employed by scientists is the best
explanation of their success in developing particular theories.15 Peter
Lipton (1996) also draws a connection between reliable methods and
true background beliefs.16
It is important to note that the miraculous endorsement argument is
not about a particular, predictively-successful theory. Rather, it is about
the ability of scientists to develop such theories. It explains their ability
in terms of the general reliability of their methods, methods which are
reliable only because they correspond to some true beliefs. The
argument looks not at specific, isolated theories but instead at the
background of theories which underwrite scientific methods — that is,
not at what we have called theories but instead what we have called
frameworks.
One can think of the framework as scientists’ background beliefs,
as Barnes does when explicating his argument; he says “novel success
is not direct evidence of theory truth — it is rather evidence for the
credibility of the endorser. More specifically, it is evidence for the truth
or empirical adequacy of the endorser’s background beliefs” (Barnes,
2008, p. 140). Barnes’ claim, both in this passage and throughout his
book, is that novel predictive success is a reason to conclude that a
scientist is a reliable expert in her domain. This expertise will partly be
a matter of background belief, in the sense of believing true
propositions, but it will also be a matter of ‘background belief’ in a
broader sense which includes approaches to theory development and
15

See e.g. Boyd (1982); importantly, this argument is different than
the one often called the ‘Boyd-Putnam argument’ for realism.
16
Lipton’s argument is that judging the merits of specific theories
requires reliable and hence approximately true background
theories.
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tacit commitment to reliable methods. What we have called the level of
theory consists of explicit claims and models, but the level of
framework consists of a less easily circumscribed raft of commitments.
Following Barnes: if a scientist is able to generate predictivelysuccessful theories, then this gives us reason to trust or adopt the
framework which she employs in doing so. Notice here that the
relevant evidence is not merely facts about data and theories — when
data was observed, how the theory was initially formulated, and so on.
As Barnes emphasizes, what matters is scientists’ endorsement of
theories which ultimately enjoy predictive success. That is what
reflects well upon scientists’ background commitments. This is what
Barnes calls endorsement novelty.
Although Barnes, Boyd, and Lipton all give these arguments in the
context of thinking about scientific realism, the assurance provided by
novel prediction can be acknowledged while remaining neutral on the
question of realism. Barnes recognizes that winning the day for realism
requires solving further problems. In the passage we quote above, he
allows for the possibility that predictive success might just be
explained by the empirical adequacy of background theories. Instead of
concluding that methods and commitments are truth conducive, one
might infer instead that they are instrumentally powerful at producing
reliable theories.
The anti-realist can grant to Barnes that scientists should and do
endorse theories that are predictively successful. Moreover, scientists’
being able to do so reflects well upon the background framework the
scientists employ in developing these theories. Of course, the antirealist will insist that this only gives us reason to believe that the
framework is empirically adequate — not that the framework’s claims
about the unobservable world are true.17 Both realists and anti-realist
empiricists can recognize a framework which consistently delivers
predictive success as reliable, and both will prefer reliable frameworks
over unreliable ones. The realist just understands reliability as the
tendency to generate true theories, whereas the anti-realist understands
it as the tendency to generate empirically successful theories.
The arguments given by Barnes, Boyd, and Lipton concur in saying
that scientists’ development of predictively successful theories reflects
well upon scientists’ framework commitments. For them, this favorable
light justifies belief; for the anti-realist, it justifies acceptance instead.
In either case, novel predictive success does important epistemic and
evidential work. The fact that a framework generates predictively
17

This is what Barnes calls the anti-realist challenge.
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successful theories gives us prima facie reason to adopt it or (if we
have already adopted it) to stick with it.
This assurance is parallel to the one that we get when a theory
generates novel and accurate predictions of unanticipated phenomena.
That gives us a reason to adopt or continue employing that theory.
When a framework or research programme generates theories which
can enjoy that kind of success, then we have a reason to adopt or
continue employing that framework. In the example from Schell and
Magnus (2007) discussed above, the rival adaptationist and medical
approaches are not things that can be directly tested. Rather, they
inform the construction of specific theories. If practitioners employing
one framework can generate predictively successful theories but
practitioners employing the other cannot, then we have a reason to
prefer the former framework to the latter. Schell and Magnus diagnose
this situation for the medical and adaptationist approaches respectively.
Schell and Magnus draw an explicit connection to Lakatos (1978).
Indeed, there are parallels between predictivism for theory-framework
relations and what Lakatos called the methodology of scientific
research programmes. To use his terminology: A research program is
progressive if it leads to theories which underwrite novel predictions
and if at least many of those predictions are accurate; a research
program is degenerating otherwise. Whereas Lakatos offered this as a
general account, suggesting that progress and degeneration were the
only considerations for or against a research program, we offer the
more modest claim that they do matter. Progress in Lakatos’ sense is
both methodologically and epistemically to a framework’s credit.
An additional element introduced by Barnes’ argument is that —
unlike data, phenomena, or theory — a framework might be largely a
matter of implicit commitments. Where that is so, we cannot write
down the framework that receives credit for the scientist’s success.
Instead, the success accrues to their tacit expertise; that is, to the
scientist as expert. Realists and antirealists disagree about whether the
expertise is a matter of truth or empirical reliability, but it is a
legitimate scientific merit in either case. And it is novel prediction that
gives us such assurance, not accommodation.
3 Weak Predictivisms
As noted in the introduction, defenses of novel prediction may seem
somewhat unfashionable. Many philosophers have argued that novel
predictive success is nothing special, that it is better understood merely
as a guide to some other confirmatory virtue and that the exploration of
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that other virtue is where the real philosophical action is. Other
philosophers, most notably John Worrall, substantially reinterpret what
counts as prediction. On Worrall’s account, the intuitive situation in
which a scientist predicts something previously unknown becomes just
a special case — and not even the most important case. We now turn to
these deflationary and ersatz predictivisms.
3.1 Would-be reduction and deflation
Some contemporary philosophers admit that predictive success might
seem to have some value, but they suggest that it is just indicative of
something more important and that the importance of predictive
success reduces to this other more important thing.
Harker (2008) and Collins (1994) are exemplary of such views.
Both insist that prediction is just a superficial proxy for considerations
of explanatory unification and that the theoretical virtue, explanatory or
unificatory power, is what really matters. Collins writes that “the
ability of a theory to make correct new predictions is not what is
ultimately important; rather, what is important is the theory’s general
structural/relational features” (Collins, 1994, p. 222). Given the
overview of the instrumental value of prediction given above, there are
several problems with their approach to reducing the value of
prediction.
First, although explanatory power and unification are important
theoretical virtues, the accounts that Collins and Harker provide fail to
show that novel prediction’s value reduces to such virtues. While novel
prediction may sometimes or even often accompany virtues such as
unification, explanatory power, and simplicity, it seems possible that a
theory could be predictively successful without exhibiting them.
Indeed, in the early stages of theory development, novel predictive
success may be our main indicator that there is something worth
pursuing further. Unification can come later. The assurance novel
prediction provides does not simply dissipate in a context where the
other virtues are absent or contested.
Second, the strategy of reducing novel prediction to a theoretical
virtue trades a marker that is relatively clear with a marker that is
problematically more vague. As Kuhn (1977) emphasized, throughout
the history of science there is a substantial degree of subjectivity in the
assessment of epistemic virtues like scope, simplicity, and explanatory
power. Individual judgements differ, and community standards change
over time. Thus, whether a theory has more or less explanatory or
unifactory power than its competitors can be a point of disagreement
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among scientists. Novel prediction is less contestable. The presence of
successful novel prediction is more clearly assessable than explanatory
power or unification even if there is disagreement about how strong a
test the novel prediction provides. Take the example of quantum
mechanics: It made successful predictions from the beginning, but the
current assessment that it is explanatory arose partly because judgments
about what is explanatory have matured in response to quantum
mechanics.
Third, critics of predictivism often presume an epistemic situation
in which a theory is fully articulated and the theory’s structural virtues
are transparent. Indeed, Collins insists that “the fundamental issue
underlying the accommodation/prediction debate is whether or not the
information that a theory predicted instead of accommodated a set of
data should increase our confidence in its truth given that we already
know the relevant structural/relational features of the theory” (Collins,
1994, p. 215, our emphasis). As noted in the beginning of sec. 2, such
perfect transparency of the relevant features of a theory is hard to come
by in the midst of scientific practice. It is a philosophical idealization,
so recommendations contingent on it provide no guidance for actual
practice. In the flow of practice, because the structural features of a
theory are never all transparent, novel prediction can provide useful
assurance.
Fourth, treating explanatory resources as features of a theory tout
court ignores the important connection between explanation and
prediction in the practice of science. Rather than being merely abstract
features of a theory, explanatory resources are a crucial predictive
resource, as noted in sec. 2.2 above. (And vice versa: Novel
predictions, successful or not, provide grist for developing
explanations.)
Fifth, the theoretical virtues are primarily confined to one level of
inference, the relationship between the theory and the phenomena. As
we elaborated above, scientific inference also occurs in relating data to
phenomena and in relating theory to frameworks. Novel prediction
provides epistemic assurance at these levels of inference as well, as
described in sec. 2.1 and 2.3.
One might accept some of our objections and attempt to reframe
Harker’s argument. If we cannot assess theoretical virtues directly, then
we must use proxies. But why, Harker asks, should be use novel
predictive success rather than other available proxies? He writes,
“Supporters of weak predictivist theses have done nothing to establish
that the advantage of predictive success over accommodative success is
any more reliable at tracking the epistemic virtues of a theory than
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considerations pertaining to the reputation of the author, advocacy of
the expert and so on” (Harker, 2008, p. 438). The argument is that
predictive success, although some indicator of confirmatory virtues,
might not be the best indicator available. Harker suggests that
considerations of expertise might be better.
Of course, this objection might well be decisive in some particular
cases. We have only argued that predictive success can often do and
typically does epistemic work. Yet Harker’s worry supposes that
predictive success and expertise can, in general, be treated as separate
indicators. Barnes’ argument (Barnes, 2008, discussed in sec. 2.3
above) shows that this separation is untenable.18 A theory’s predictive
success provides assurance for the framework which led to the theory,
and some of this credit extends to the scientists who employed the
framework, developed the theory, and endorsed the prediction. Because
the framework involves tacit as well as explicit elements, this
recognition of expertise cannot be eliminated in favor of purely formal
confirmation of general theories. Novel predictive success interacts
with expertise, and thus it would not be possible to jettison novel
prediction while retaining considerations of expertise.19
The kind of reduction proposed by Harker and Collins is not the
only one in the field. Mayo (1996) attempts a different reduction of
prediction’s virtues. She argues that novel prediction is only valuable
because it is frequently associated with severe tests; that is, tests where
the hypothesis under consideration would not have passed the test had
the hypothesis been false. Novel prediction, on her view, is thus just an
indicator for what really matters: viz., severe tests. Here too, the
reduction fails for scientific practice. In order to assess whether a test
was in fact severe, we need to account or control for all the sources of
error. While this kind of assurance can be gained in controlled
experimental contexts, it is much less clear how we are to achieve this
in more complex contexts. Indeed, the applicability of Mayo’s
approach to all of scientific inference is a central concern for her
critics; see recent discussions by Achinstein, Musgrave, and Worrall (in
Mayo and Spanos, 2010). Thus, the value of novel prediction across the
full range of scientific contexts resists Mayo’s reduction.
18

At minimum, Harker’s claim (Harker, 2008, cited above) that
supporters of predictivism have nothing to say about the relation
between novel predictive success and expertise is now false.
19
In any case, the revised argument avoids at most the first three of
the five worries about deflation that we raise earlier in this section.
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3.2 Worrall’s Predictivism
John Worrall has been one of the most original commentators on the
value of novel prediction. Worrall’s view focuses on the assessment of
theories and issues of parameter fixing. Within this context, he is
concerned with the value of heuristic or use-novel predictions: the
‘predicted’ claim might already be common knowledge, as long it does
not figure in the actual construction of the theory. For Worrall, this is a
logical rather than historical matter. In some sense, for Worrall,
“novelty is not the issue at all” (Worrall 2002, p. 194). Importantly,
timing is irrelevant. For example, Fresnel’s wave theory of light had
one free parameter (wave length) which could be fixed using
experimental data (measuring the wave length with which the scientist
is working). With this parameter fixed, Fresnel’s theory could be used
to derive other experimental results, such as straight-edge diffraction.
Even though straight-edge diffraction was a known phenomena to
Fresnel when he constructed his theory, the derivation of the diffraction
pattern using the wave length and Fresnel’s theory counts as a usenovel prediction. For Worrall, it is this kind of use-novelty which
provides genuine empirical support to a theory, and nothing else does.
Worrall maintains that accommodating data within a theory is
appropriate given that we have independent reasons to accept the
theory, and he holds that use-novel predictions provide those
independent reasons. Thus, it is fine to use data to fix a specific
parameter in a set of equations which are otherwise well motivated. Yet
this motivation is conditional. Worrall explains, “Given that a general
framework… is already accepted, then the data give… conclusive
support” (Worrall, 2002, p. 203). (Here he means ‘framework’ to be
something that is fully explicit, and so it is closer to what we here call a
theory than what we call a framework.) In order to motivate accepting a
theory, however, there must be some other kind of evidential support,
and he suggests that there is a special value for predictions which were
not exploited in constructing the theory itself. The special value of
these use-novel predictions explains how evidence can justify
accepting such a theory in the first place.20
In one sense, Worrall’s predictivism is of the strongest sort, in that
only use-novel evidence counts as genuine support for a theory. Yet,
the structural aspects of Worrall’s view limit its applicability. Worrall’s
view cannot be the whole story. First, it is too stark. Where it
20

This is a long-running theme in his work. For a clear, recent
statement, see Worrall (2002).
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acknowledges a special value for prediction, it cannot allow
accommodated evidence to count for anything. Second, applying it
requires being able to clearly assess whether a prediction is use-novel.
This requires a clear mathematical structure to a theory and a clear
assessment of its parameters, clarity which is often lacking. So, despite
its merits, Worrall’s account cannot be the whole story. Recognizing
the value of novel prediction outside of the confines of Worrall’s view
requires that we once again consider the temporal aspects of novel
prediction, as we did in sec. 2. We add that temporal, endorsement
novelty assures us of use-novelty, and so it provides the support that
Worrall articulates in cases where we cannot independently assess usenovelty. Strict use-novelty is hard to assess when parameters and the
mathematical structure of the theory are not transparent, so true
temporal novelty can provide the epistemic support Worrall seeks for
less precise theories.
There is a broader lesson here. Attempts to reduce the issue of
predictivism to the logical structure of theories and evidence or
particular epistemic virtues, often by demanding perfect transparency
of evidential theory relationships, will miss precisely what is so
valuable about predictions: When these things are obscure, when we do
not know that we have accounted for all sources of error, then novel
prediction provides the a useful epistemic assurance that we are on the
right track. It is often only possible to characterize scientific success in
precise terms long after it is a settled matter, so genuine novel
prediction is an important resource in the flow of practice.
4 Pluralist instrumental predictivism
The survey provided here shows that prediction provides epistemic
goods and additional assurance above and beyond accommodation at a
number of points in scientific inference. For inferences from data to
phenomena, from phenomena to theories, and from theories to
framework, novel prediction provides distinct epistemic advantages.
These epistemic assurances include: insurance against overfitting,
evidential relevance to the explanatory structure of a theory, and
reliable production of successful theories. In addition, novel predictions
provide other epistemic goods, such as uncovering new relevant
evidence and new evidence/theory relations.
These assurances are all defeasible, but the point of epistemic
assurance is not to be infallible. Rather, it is to indicate that our
knowledge production is on the right track and likely to be reliable.
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Novel prediction is neither a perfect warrant nor universally valuable,
but rather it is commonly, locally valuable.
As we have seen, some authors defend predictivism but consider
predictive success to have just one function. We have cast our net more
widely and have found more ways that predictions provides epistemic
assurance. We make no claims to completeness, though. We have
discussed the advantages of prediction under three headings, but we do
not think of novel predictive success as having a perfect trinity of
virtues. Predictions may be connected to the explanatory structure of a
theory in several ways, for example, and so the advantages at the
theory-phenomena boundary might themselves be numerous.
The value of novel prediction is especially clear for inferences in
actual, everyday science, because the complete structure of a theory
under development is unavailable and because the features of a
framework in use are not fully articulated and may remain tacit. Even
though novel predictions are not a perfect assurance, and are not even
optimally-assuring in all contexts, they often provide epistemic
assurance that cannot be easily or feasibly bought in other ways. More
philosophically-pure epistemic checks are often expensive or would
require ideal circumstances. In contrast, for real cases, novel
predictions provide a readily available and applicable epistemic check.
For the state of incomplete knowledge in which epistemic actors
actually find themselves, the assurance of novel prediction has clear
advantages over attempting to assess the qualities of accommodation.
Thus, novel prediction typically does give us reason to credit both
the scientist who made the prediction and the representations used in
making it. This reason is not because of an intrinsic feature of novel
predictive success, but neither is it reducible to any one other
dimension of confirmation. Novel success is typically an indication of
numerous confirming factors. Attempts to make these indications
superfluous will usually fail, both because there are so many disparate
indications involved and because scientists are often unable to
infallibly make direct assessment of them. Novel predictive success has
an instrumental rather than an intrinsic value, but its typical
instrumental value is sufficiently multifarious that no other tool can
readily replace it. We dub this position Pluralist Instrumental
Predictivism; PIP for short.21 We predict that developing the various
21

We use ‘pluralist’ only to mean that there are many instrumental
values for prediction, not to invoke any broader philosophical
pluralisms. We use ‘instrumental’ only in opposition to ‘intrinsic’,
not to suggest anti-realism about the prediction or theory.
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advantages of prediction provides across a range of contexts will be a
fruitful avenue for understanding scientific inference in practice.
In sum, for scientific inference at various levels — from data to
phenomena, from phenomena to theory, from theory to framework —
novel predictions generally provide better epistemic assurance than
accommodation. The epistemic assurance novel prediction provides,
imperfect as it is, is of such general applicability in such a wide range
of contexts and is so difficult to replace with anything else that novel
prediction should be considered generally instrumentally valuable to
scientific practice. Even if novel prediction is a surrogate in some cases
for other strong sources of assurance (such as AIC in inferences from
data to phenomena or severe tests in experimental contexts), it may be
more readily available in particular cases and thus can still provide
valuable epistemic assurance. The correct way to view the value of
novel predictions is one of pluralist instrumentalism, acknowledging it
as an important epistemic resource in scientific practice.
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